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Charitable Community Development
Corporations and The Tax Reform
Act of 1969
Melvyn R. Durchslag
Although the Tax Reform Act of 1969 has produced a variety of
changes, none have been so substantial as those governing privately sup-
ported charities. This article analyzes new Code provisions in terms of
their operational significance to the tax exempt community develop-
ment corporation. The author concludes that while a community de-
velopment corporation may avoid being treated as a private foundation,
or at least avoid some of the harsher incidents of that status, to do so
may seriously hamper its operating efficiency. Consequently, the author
suggests that a community development corporation, not expecting large
amounts of governmental funding, should consider seeking a tax exemp-
tion under provisions of the Code other than those granting charitable
exemptions.
I. INTRODUCTION
E TOCQUEVILLE once commented that in no other coun-
try of the world do the citizens make such exertions for the
common weal. True as this might have been and may still be,
American beneficence has been inadequate to satisfy all of our so-
cietal needs. Today, there ex-
ists in this country a substantial
THE AUTHOR: MELVYN R. DURCHSLAG number of persons who have
(B.S., J.D., Northwestern University)
is an Assistant Professor of Law at Case been unable to prove their eco-
Western Reserve University, and is ad- nomic worth in what has be-
mitted to the Illinois and Ohio Bars. come the most technologically
His teaching specialties are Legal Prob-
lems of the Poor, Urban Development advanced society in history.
and Business Associations. He is the These are the poor. Data as
Director of the Legal Clinic at Case
Western Reserve University. to their number is readily avail-
able.' The available statistical
data is misleading, however,
since a satisfactory definition of poverty should signify more than
the mere non-attainment of a defined income level. It is rather the
relative inability to purchase the aggregate of "necessities" made
1 In 1970, approximately 25.5 million persons, 12.6% of the total population,
earned less than $3,968 per year, the so-called poverty line for a family of four residing
in an urban area. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS
2-4 (Series P-60, No. 77, May 7, 1971). An additional 10.2 million persons earned not
more than $4,960 per year. Id. at 8.
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available by our productive capacity. These include safe, sanitary
and decent housing facilities,2 municipal services adequate to meet
existing needs, 3 consumer goods obtained under "reasonable" terms
and conditions, 4 an education approaching that available to the more
affluent,5 and, generally, participation in the institutions which pro-
vide one with the financial and psychological ability to achieve.'
Moreover, poverty is a selfnurturing process. The greater one's in-
ability to "purchase" certain goods and services deemed to be essen-
tial by society the less is the likelihood that the individual and his
progeny will attain full economic participation in our society.7
Surprisingly, most federal programs to date have been little more
than attempts to sustain people at a "poverty level"8 or to make
2 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS
467-74 (1968); G. STERNUEB, THE TENM MNT LANDLORD 76-86 (1966).
3 See, e.g., Hadnott v. City of Prattville, 309 F. Supp. 967 (M.D. Ala. 1970),
where the court after finding no racial discrimination, upheld a method of financing
certain municipal services on the basis of a taxpayer's ability to pay for them. But cf.
Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, Mississippi, 437 F. 2d 1286, 1293 (5th Cir. 1971) (con-
curring opinion).
4 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 274-
77 (1968); T. CROSS, BLACK CAPiTAIISm 44-55, 168, 214-19 (1969).
5 A. WISE, RICH SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS: THE PROMISE OF EQUAL EDUCA-
TIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1969); Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity:
A Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L REv. 305,
307-12 (1969). But see OFFICE OF EDUCATION, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPOR-
TUNITY 316 (1969), the so-called "Coleman Report," which concluded on the evidence
compiled that there was little correlation between the amount expended per pupil and
the quality of education received.
GAs one commentator has observed:
"One is poor not because he has no money, but because, possibly owing to lack
of money, he lacks also access to the social instrumentalities that make humanly
significant action possible. In part, it is a simple matter of not having the price
of admission .... But in larger part it is a matter of not having the character
or competence... that establishes one's capability of taking up an opportu-
nity ...."
Haworth, Deprivation and the Good City, in POWER, POVERTY AND URBAN POLICY 39
(1968). See generally Goodpaster, An Introduction to the Community Development
Corporation, 46 J. URB. LAW 603 (1969); Phemister & Hildebrand, The Use of Non-
Profit Corporations and Cooperatives for Ghetto Economic Development, 48 J. URB.
LAW 181, 181-88 (1970).
7 For example, many authorities have concluded that the amount of dollars ex-
pended per pupil bears a direct relationship to the quality of education the pupil receives-
To the extent that per student expenditure is determined by the aggregate tax base of the-
community, a low tax base will produce a low educational output. Compare the conclu-
sions of Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra note 5 (a community with a low tax base is un-
able to provide adequately for the education of its youth) with the conclusions of L-
THUROW, POVERTY AND DISCRIMINATION 37-39 (1969) (quality education is one of
the more effective ways of eliminating poverty).
8 See, e.g., Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-06 (aid for the blind),.
1351-55 (aid for the permanently and totally disabled), §§ 601-610 (aid to families.
with dependent children) (Supp. V, 1969).
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living at that level somewhat more tolerable.' More surprising is
the fact that most litigation on behalf of poor persons has either
been designed to produce, or, in fact, has produced, little more than
the same results.'
It is the challenge of securing for the poor a greater economic
share of and a stake in our society to which the community develop-
ment corporation directs itself. It attempts to achieve this goal not
by litigative or legislative advocacy," but rather by creating an
economic environment within a narrowly defined community condu-
cive to participation by persons heretofore excluded from the main-
stream of economic life. The purpose of this article is to explore
the extent to which federal income tax policy, and more particu-
larly, the Tax Reform Act of 19691 affects the ability of a com-
mnunity development corporation to achieve that goal. Because
community development corporations can and do operate in a
variety of ways, for ease of discussion it is assumed that the
9 See, e.g., United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-36 (Supp. V,
1969) (public housing); Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, § 101, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1701s (Supp. IV, 1968) (rent supplement payments for persons residing in non-profit
and/or limited distribution sponsored housing). There are, however, two notable excep-
tions. First is the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, 42 U.S.C. §§
2571-2620 (Supp. V, 1969), which provides private enterprise with a financial incentive
to train or retrain the unemployed. Second is Title I-D of the Economic Opportunity
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2763-68 (Supp. V, 1969), which is designed to provide large
sums of money to local community development corporations in order to more adequately
deal with problems of "dependency, chronic unemployment and rising community ten-
sions."
'oE.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (due process requires that a wel-
fare recipient be given a hearing prior to the termination of welfare benefits); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (a state must grant public assistance to qualified persons
irrespective of the length of their residence in that state); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309
(1968) (children residing in a home where unrelated males also reside are entitled to
AFDC benefits); Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970) (a tenant of a substandard dwelling is entitled to a pro rata
reduction in rent for the depreciated value of the unit); Escalera v. New York Housing
Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970) (Goldberg rationale
applied to public housing lease terminations); Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969) (a tenant is protected from an eviction
motivated by the tenant's having reported housing code violations to the appropriate
enforcing agency).
For the most part, litigation designed to secure a greater share of governmental lar-
gess to the poor has been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471(1970); Ward v. Winstead, 314 F. Supp. 1225 (D. Miss. 1970), appeal dismissed, ---
U.S. (1971); Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Il. 1968), aj'd sub -nom.
McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
11 A community development corporation exempt from federal income taxation
under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [hereinafter cited as I.R.
C. is prohibited from expending any substantial effort in the legislative arena. For a
discussion of this prohibition and its impact on a charitable organization see Note, The
Revenue Code and a Charity's Politics, 73 YALE L.J. 661 (1964).
12 Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969).
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
corporate activities are centered in a community where: (1) there
exists a substantial number of substandard dwelling units; (2) un-
employment far exceeds the national average; (3) few of the indus-
trial, commercial, retail and service facilities in the community are
owned, controlled, or operated by the residents of that community;
and (4) the aggregate community income is so low as to be unable
to support retail or service facilities sufficient to meet everyday re-
quirements. The corporation desires to stem the tide of economic
decay by attracting venture capital and using that capital to create
businesses which will employ and train a maximum number of com-
munity residents. After the point in time at which those businesses
reach a satisfactory level of profitability, the ownership thereof will
be transferred, in whole or in part, to community residents."3
II. THE COMMUNITY DEV ELOPMENT CORPORATION
A. The Case for the Community Development Corporation as a
Non-Profit Entity
It can be said with little fear of contradiction that all community
development corporations possess the common goals of controlling
the economic resources within a particular community and using
those resources for the benefit of persons residing in that community.
To achieve those goals it is necessary to utilize an entity most ap-
propriate to maintain community control while at the same time
allowing for the conduct of business activities. In addition, that
entity must be structured so as to provide the financial incentives
necessary to attract the needed capital.
Traditionally, an enterprise desiring to engage in business acti-
vities and seeking the equity capital to do so has found in the
business corporation the opportunity to attract large amounts of
capital from a variety of sources and, at the same time, provide the
greatest degree of flexibility in operation. 14  For a community de-
velopment corporation, however, this approach is likely to result
in the production of a small amount of equity capital because of the
community's inability to aggregate sufficient capital to make a sub-
stantial investment.' 5
13 For an analysis of the problems of stock distributions by a community develop-
ment corporation see Miller, Community Capitalism and the Community Self-Determi-
nation Act, 6 HARV. J .LEGIS. 413, 451-55 (1969); Note, Community Development Cor-
porations: Operations and Financing, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1559, 1614-1627 (1970).
14 1 G. HORNST N, CORPORATION LAW AND PRAcncE § 21 (1959); C. Is-
RAELS, CoRPoRATE PRACTIcE 29-45 (2d ed. 1969).
15 Cf. Note, supra note 13, at 1616-17.
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Faced with this likelihood, the community development corpora-
tion must seek much of its equity from without the community,
while still seeking to prevent dilution of intra-community control.
It is in the attempt to satisfy the competing goals of community con-
trol and capital attraction that a community development entity or-
ganized as a business corporation is most likely to fail. Assuming
statutory authority to do so, it might issue non-voting common or
preferred stock.1" Unfortunately the typical investor will in all like-
lihood demand some accountability from the organization in which
his funds are invested, assuming no ready market through which he
can recoup that investment. Accountability in a corporate context
usually presupposes some form of voting control or voting power,
something which the community development corporation desires
to avoid with respect to "outsiders." While it is possible to achieve
accountability at the sacrifice of only short run control by issuing
redeemable voting stock, care must be taken to assure potential in-
vestors that the later redemption will not be treated as a dividend. 7
More important, funds necessary for redemption might better be
applied to furthering the purposes for which the development cor-
poration was organized. Further, investors generally desire an ade-
quate return from their investment, in the form of either dividends
or an increase in the value of their stock. Given the kinds of ven-
tures in which community development corporations typically en-
gage, an attractive return, at least in the short run, is highly specu-
lative.' Consequently the market for community development
corporation stock outside the community would be limited, at best.
Because the financial incentives available to equity investors in
the business corporation are virtually non-existent in the community
development corporation, the entity ought to be organized in such a
manner as to create a different kind of incentive, one accruing at the
time of the initial investment rather than at some future date. By
casting the entity as a non-profit corporation, permitting qualification
as a charity under the Internal Revenue Code, the corporation may
provide such an immediate incentive in the form of the charitable
16 Illinois appears to be the only state which prohibits a corporation from issuing
non-voting stock of any class or kind. See ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 32 § 157.28 (1954).
17 I.R.C. § 302.
18 ECCO, an economic development corporation in Columbus, Ohio, has formed
a business subsidiary, the ECCO Development Corporation. Estimates are that the sub-
sidiary will generate no funds available for dividends for "several years." Note, The
Neighborhood Development Corporation: A Case Study of the East Central Citizen's
Organization, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 49, 64 (1970). This comports with the experience of
Action Industries Inc. in Venice, California. See Note, supra note 13, at 1570.
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deduction allowed to those contributing funds. 9 Postponing for
a moment the possibility of charitable status for the organization,
the question is whether a non-profit corporation can engage in
business activities to the same extent as a business corporation. It is
now clear in most states that the non-profit nature of an organiza-
tion does not preclude its undertaking any activity, including those
traditionally undertaken only by business corporations.20 For pur-
poses of this discussion, the only relevant distinction is the non-profit
corporation's incapacity to distribute its net earnings to members,
directors or officers. 2 '
B. The Community Development Corporation as a
Charitable Organization
Should the corporation obtain non-profit status, so as to qualify
more easily as a charity under the Internal Revenue Code, the result-
ant exemption will restrict not only the ability to distribute proceeds
of any business venture but its authority to engage in such a venture
as well. Organizations exempt from federal income taxation are
those
... organized and operated exclusively for... charitable ... pur-
poses ... no part of the net earnings of which inures to the bene-
fit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of
the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise
attempting to influence legislation and which does not participate
in or intervene in . . . any political campaign on behalf of any
candidate for public office.22
An organization satisfying the statutory criteria, in addition to being
19 It is arguable that one indined to invest in a community development corpora-
tion is better off financially if his investment is treated as a charitable contribution rather
than a stock purchase. This may be illustrated by a perhaps overly simplified example.
Assume an individual in a 50% tax bracket possesses $5,000 in cash which may be used
either for the purchase of stock or for a charitable contribution. If that $5,000 is used to
purchase stock, it -may be recovered at some later date with or without appreciation. In
addition, the investor may receive dividends, either in cash or stock. The same $5,000
donated to charity, will result in a permanent loss to cash flow of $2,500 but the
balance, produced as a result of tax savings, may be invested at normal or above normal
rates of return, resulting in an assured return of the full $5,000 at some definable time.
2 0 MODEL NoN-PRoFIT CORP. AcT § 26 (1964). See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1702.01 (Baldwin 1971). See generally H. OLEcK, NoN-PROFIT CORPORA-
TiONS, ORGANIZATiONS AND AsSOCIATIONS 3, 115 (2d ed. 1965); Lesher, The Non-
Profit Corporatiop - A Neglected Step Child Comes of Age, 22 Bus. LAWYER 951
(1967); Phemister & Hildebrand, supra note 6.
21 There are, of course, other major differences, for example: to whom the assets
must be distributed on dissolution; the inability to issue shares which reflect an indicia
of ownership in the corporation; and the increased supervisory powers of the Secretary of
State. See MODEL NoN-PRoEiT CORP. Acr §§ 26,46,87-90 (1964).
22 I.R.C. § 501 (c)(3).
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exempt from federal taxation, acquires the ability to attract funds by
reason of the charitable deduction granted to donors by the Code.a
Assuming that the articles of incorporation are appropriately
drafted,2 4 the question remains whether the activities of a com-
munity development corporation are such as to qualify it for a
charitable exemption. The answer to this question depends upon
how charity is defined for purposes of the Code and the effect of
business activities on that definition. Charity is not expressly de-
fined in the Code. Rather the definition corresponds to its generally
accepted historical meaning" which has been variously stated as:
"trusts, for the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of
education; trusts for the advancement of religion; and trusts for
purposes beneficial to the community, not falling under any of the
preceding heads;"' 26 organizations " 'such as are calculated to relieve
the poor and to promote such education and employment as the
laws of the land recognize as useful;' "27 or organizations which
contain "any benevolent or philanthropic objective not prohibited
by law or public policy which tends to advance the well-doing and
well-being of man. 2 8 Thus, charity is something more than "mere
almsgiving, or relief of poverty."" It includes undertakings which
are deemed by society, at any given time, to be generally beneficial
to an indeterminate but substantial number of persons.
Treasury Department regulations generally follow this broad
notion of charity. They define charity to include "[r]elief of the
poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of
religion; advancement of education or science . . . lessening the
burdens of Government . . . lessen[ing] neighborhood tensions and
eliminat[ing] prejudice and discrimination...... .The regulations,
like most judicial interpretations, are too broad to be definitive.
28 I.R.C. § 170(a)(1).
24 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c)(3)-l(b)&(c) (1959).
25 Rev. Rul. 67-325, 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 113; Reiling, Federal Income Taxation:
What is a Charitable Organization?, 44 A.B.A.J. 525, 526 (1958).
2 6 Commissioner For Spedal Purposes of the Income Tax v. Pensel, [1891] A.C.
531, 583 (emphasis added). The fourth category has been one of constant concern to
courts both here and in the British Commonwealth. For a comprehensive, albeit confus-
ing, analysis of how that concern has been reflected see Fridman, Charities and Public
Benefit, 31 CAN. B. REv. 537 (1953).
2 7 Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539, 555 (1867) (emphasis added); cf. Kain v.
Gibboney, 101 U.S. 362, 365 (1879).
28 Peters v. Comm'r, 21 T.C. 55, 59 (1953). See also Arthur Jordan Foundation
v. Comm'r, 210 F. 2d 885, 888 (7th Cir. 1954).
29 Schell v. Leander Clark College, 10 F.2d 542, 553 (N.D. Iowa 1926).
5
°Treas. Reg. 1.501 (c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1959).
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Therefore, to determine whether a community development corpora-
tion is charitable one must look to the rationale for providing tax ex-
emptions to charitable organizations.
The rationale behind charitable exemptions appears to be
founded on two interrelated yet distinct notions. The first is that
the charity is expending its funds for programs which, if not pri-
vately financed, might otherwise have to be undertaken by the
government with public funds.31  This reason, however, merely
poses the question why all of the income of all organizations should
not be taxed at perhaps a higher rate, thereby providing the funds
necessary to do what private philanthropy is now doing? The an-
swer, quite simply (and this is the second basis upon which the tax
exemption rationale rests), is that our society feels very strongly that
privately supported endeavors are superior to a substantial assump-
tion of those activities by a governmental body. Private philanthropy
is thought to provide the best means for achieving creativity, experi-
mentation and flexibility. In addition it insures, in this area at least,
the maintenance of a pluralistic balance between government and
the private sector.3 2 That being the rationale, and our assumption
being that the primary purpose of the community development cor-
poration is to provide employment opportunities, on-the-job training
and ownership of economic resources by those previously excluded
therefrom, it is necessary to determine whether the model community
development corporation described earlier fits within the rationale
for a charitable exemption.
Some commentators have suggested that the creation of new bus-
iness enterprises in deteriorating areas does fit the rationale for a
charitable exemptionns and indeed some community development
31Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144 (1934). Watron v. U.S. 355 F.2d 269 (3d
Cir. 1965). Harrison v. Barker Annuity Fund, 90 F. 2d 286,288 (7th Cir. 1937). Young
Men's Christian Association of Germantown v. City of Philadelphia, 323 Pa. 401, 413;
187 A. 204, 210 (1936). See H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. 19, 20
(1938); A. JOHNSON, PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE CHARITIES 1 (1931); Note, Tax
Exemptions of American Church Properties, 14 MICH. L. RE v. 646, 647 (1916).
3 2 See TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT ON PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (Comm. Print 1965) (prepared for the House Committee on
Ways and Means) [hereinafter cited as TREASURY REPORT]; Hearings on H.R. 13270
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 6, at 5346-5402 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]; Hearings on Tax Reform Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 79-89 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as House Hearings]. See generally Creel, The Role of the Foundation in Today's
Society, 9 N.Y.U. CONFERENCE ON CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS 1 (1969); Flechner,
Charitable Foundations and Their Benefits, 34 NEB. L REV. 630 (1955); Sacks, The Role
of Philanthropy: An Institutional View, 46 VA. L. REV. 516 (1960).
33 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 13, at 434-39; Note, Tax Exemption for Organiza-
tions Investing in Black Businesses, 78 YALE L.J. 1212 (1969).
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corporations organized and operated along the lines posited have
been granted exemptions.3 ' The accepted notion of "lessening the
burdens of government" is not, however, a sufficient statement of
the reasoning behind such exemptions. Experience indicates that
community development corporations actually do little to lessen the
financial burdens of government; by relying on federal assistance
programs they merely redirect those burdens into new areas.35 Thus,
we are confronted not with the circumstance of private philanthropy
undertaking what government would have to do otherwise, but
rather an attempt by the "private sector" to attract government
funds into the economic development arena in addition to receiving
the tax benefits normally available only to those which save the gov-
ernment that expense. It is apparent, therefore, that the availability
of a charitable exemption rests upon: (1) the general benefits to
society of having persons employed and/or trained for employ-
ment; (2) the government's inability to create and operate the
enterprises necessary to job creation, training and economic security;
and (3) the reluctance of private enterprise to undertake these
kinds of programs.3
Assuming that a community development corporation is orga-
nized to provide something which society deems beneficial and which
neither can be provided by government nor is being provided by
private enterprise, the question remains whether the vehicle used
to provide those benefits - the operation of businesses for pro-
fit - is appropriate in light of advantages accorded the community
development corporation by way of federal income tax exemption.
In context the question is whether the benefits accruing to society are
sufficient to balance the relative disadvantage at which competitive
businesses are placed by reason of the tax exemption granted to the
community development corporation.
In the abstract, there is nothing to prevent a charitable organi-
zation from conducting, either directly or through wholly owned
34 Note, supra note 13, at 1609-13; Note, Tax and Other Legal Aspects of Business
Involvement in Ghetto Development Programs, 20 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 825, 836-37,
849-55 (1969).
35 For an analysis of the various federal financial assistance programs and how
these programs may be used by community development corporations see Note, supra
note 13, at 1594-1607, 1627-58.
36 Sacks, supra note 32, at 520-21; cf. Note, Tax and Other Legal Aspects of Busi-
ness Involvement in Ghetto Development Programs, supra note 34. If private enterprise
assumes the burden of training and employment on a significant scale, it would necessar-
ily follow that tax exemption for community development corporations would no longer
be available.
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subsidiaries, businesses which compete with others not afforded tax
exemption. The Treasury Department's only concern is: (1) wheth-
er the businesses are "related" to the exempt purposes of the or-
ganization; and (2) if unrelated, whether the organization is oper-
ated primarily to carry on that unrelated business.37 The tests for
determining whether a business is related to the exempt purposes of
the organization are set forth in the regulations promulgated pur-
suant to section 513 .38 These regulations require a substantial
causal relationship between the business, and presumably the man-
ner in which it is conducted, and the accomplishment of the orga-
nization's exempt purposes.39
It would appear an easy task to assert the relationship between
the exempt purposes of a community development corporation and
the conduct of a business which employs the previously unemployed,
which trains the previously untrained for future employment in the
private sector and which provides the mechanism whereby the bene-
fits of capital ownership can be secured for all. Yet the tests which
the Treasury Department and the courts use to implement the
regulations are far from clear and provide little predictability.
The concept of unrelated business income was first codified by
the Revenue Act of 1950. 40 Excepting a few courts,41 prior to 1950
the only question was whether the income earned by an organization
eventually found its way to charitable destinations.42 The source
of the income or how that income was earned was irrelevant. Courts
were unwilling to presume that Congress intended to deny exemp-
tion to an organization which used the business vehicle to feed
3 7 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(e)(1) (1967) provides:
An organization may meet the requirements of section 501(c)(3) although it
operates a trade or business as a substantial part of its activities if the operation
of such trade or business is in furtherance of the organization's exempt purpose
. . . and if the organization is not organized or operated for the primary pur-
pose of carrying on an unrelated trade or business. ....
38I.R.C. § 513 defines an unrelated trade or business to be one which is not sub-
stantially related to the exercise of the organization's exempt functions other than that
organization's need for funds.
3 9 Treas. Reg. 1.513-1(a)(2) (1967).
4064 Star. 947-54 (1950).
4 1 John Danz Charitable Trust v. Comm'r, 231 F.2d 673 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 828 (1956); Ralph H. Eaton Foundation v. Comm'r, 219 F. 2d 527 (9th Cir.
1955); U.S. v. Community Services, Inc., 189 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 932 (1952).
42 Bohemian Gymnastic Ass'n v. Higgins, 147 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1954); C.F. Muel-
ler Co. v. Comm'r, 190 F.2d 120 (3rd Cir. 1951); Comm'r v. Orton, 173 F.2d 483, 486
(6th Cir. 1948); Debs Memorial Radio Fund, Inc. v. Comm'r, 148 F.2d 948 (2d Cir.
1945); Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Comm'r, 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cit. 1938); Sand Springs Home
v. Comm'r, 6 B.T.A. 198, 216-17 (1927).
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other charitable organizations while permitting an exemption to an
organization which used the business vehicle to feed its own char-
itable activities. 43 In addition, some courts thought that the benefits
accruing as a result of charitable activities were far too important
to be left to the whims of private donors.44
Evidencing a concern for the anti-competitive effects of these
judicial decisions, Congress enacted several provisions dealing with
the business income of exempt organizations. The so-called
"feeder" provision, now section 502, provided that an organization
would not be exempt solely because all of its income was destined
for charitable goals.4" A second provision imposed a tax on the
unrelated business income of an exempt organization. 4 It is sig-
nificant that only section 502 dealt with the amount of business
activity and then only with the situation of a business corporation
which administered no charitable activities of its own, which con-
ducted its business enterprises in direct competition with private
taxable entities and whose only basis for exemption was the char-
itable destination of its income. All other exempt organizations
which, in order to provide funds for their own exempt activities,
engaged in unrelated business activities were required to pay a tax
on the income generated therefrom.
Theoretically then, an exempt organization which engaged in
unrelated business ventures merely to finance the conduct of its own
charitable activities should not have lost its exemption. By a process
of confused reasoning, however, this has not been the result. In
order to determine whether a business is related to the exempt
purposes of an organization, the Treasury Department and the
courts have used criteria, some of which are more appropriately
4 3 Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Comm'r, 96 F.2d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1938). This reading
of congressional intent is not unsupported by congressional history. As early as 1943,
the Treasury Department requested that stringent controls be imposed upon the business
activities of exempt organizations. See Hearings on Revenue Revisions Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 89 (1942). Congress failed to react
until 1950.
44 Sand Springs Home v. Comm'r, 6 B.T.A. 198, 214 (1927).
45Presently I.R.C. § 502, last amended by section 121(b)(7) of Pub. L. No. 91-
172, 83 Stat. 542 (1969). See generally, Note, The Macaroni Monopoly: The De-
veloping Concept of Unrelated Business Income of Exempt Organizations, 81 HARV. L
REV. 1280 (1968).
46Presently I.R.C. §§ 511-513 (last amended by sections 121 (a)&(b) of Pub. L.
No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 536-40 (1969).
47 Eliasberg, Charity and Commerce: Section 501(c)(3) - How Much Unrelated
Business Activity, 21 TAx L. REV. 53 (1965); Grant, Taxation of Charitable Organiza-
tions Engaging in Business Activities, 4 U.C.L.A. I- RE v. 352 (1957); Sugarman & Pom-
eroy, Business Income of Exempt Organizations, 46 VA. L. REV. 424 (1960).
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designed for determining the.primary purpose of the organization."
To determine whether a business is substantially related to the
exempt purposes of an organization the nature and size of the
business must be compared to the nature and extent of the exempt
activities of the organization.49 The factors most often considered
are: the amount, in gross numerical terms, of the profit earned by
the business;50 the manner in which the business is conducted as
compared to the manner in which similar businesses are conducted
by profit motivated entrepreneurs; 5 the amount of time devoted to
the business as opposed to the amount of time devoted to other
activities; 52 and whether the income is earned fortuitously or wheth-
er it appears to be earned by design.5 3  Only where it is clear, in the
abstract, that the businesses are related and the amount of income
is not excessive will the nature of the business activity be determi-
native.' Once having determined that the income from the busi-
ness is unrelated either because of the relative time devoted to the
production of that income or the amount of that income when com-
pared with the extent of the organization's charitable activities, it
follows almost a fortiori that, the purpose to produce a profit is sub-
48 Cf. Eliasberg, supra note 47.
40 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-2(a)(4) (1968). See also Parker v. Comm'r, 365 F.2d 792,
796-99 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 1026 (1967). In fact, the regulations spe-
cifically prqvide that a business is not to be treated as related merely because some use is
made of.the business to further the organization's exempt purpose. Treas. Reg. §1.5 I3-2 (a;*(W (1958).
50 Scripture Press Foundation v. U.S., 285 F.2d 800, 803 (Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. de-
nied, 386 U.S.,985 (1962); Forest Press, Inc. v. Comm'r, 22 T.C. 265 (1954). But see
St. Germain Foundation v. Comm'r, 26 T.C. 648 (1956); cf. Forest Lawn Memorial Park
Ass'n v. Comm'r, 45 B.T.A. 1091, 1102 (1941).
5 1 American Institute for Economic Research v. United States, 302 F.2d 934 (Ct. Cl.
1962); Rev. Rul. 58-482, 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 273; Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(1) (1968).
52 Parker v. Comm'r, 365 F.2d 792, 796-99 (8th Cir. 1966).
53 Cf. Elisian Guild, Inc. v. United States, 412 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1969) where the
court stated that "while the government rightly contends that failure to show a profit
does not per se entitle a corporation to exempt status . . . in this case the deficit opera-
tion reflects not poor business planning or ill fortune but rather the fact that profits were
not the goal of the operation." Id. at 125.
54 Texas Mobile Home Ass'a v. Comm'r, 324 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1963) (income
earned from mobile home shows by a business league designed to improve conditions
in the mobile home industry held to be related); Squire v. Students Book Store Corp.,
191 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1951) (operation of a bookstore selling mainly to students where
college held all the stock in the store was held related to the exempt functions of the col-
lege); Mobile Arts and Sports Ass'n v. U.S., 148 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ala. 1957) (income
from ticket sales for the Senior Bowl football game held to be related to organization's
social welfare purposes); Hospital Bureau of Standards and Supplies, Inc. v. United
States, 158 F. Supp. 560 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (membership corporation which performed
various services for its exempt member hospitals for a fee held exempt). See Rev. Rul.
68-581, 1968-2 CuM. BULL 1250 (income earned from sale of goods made by students
at a vocational school is related).
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stantial, if not predominant, irrespective of an organization's chari-
table intentions. The exemption is, therefore, unavailable." In this
manner the complexities of the Revenue Act of 1950 can easily be
avoided for the easier test imposed by the exemption statute itself -
whether the organization is operated exclusively for charitable pur-
poses.
The possibility of losing its charitable exemption is thus a
substantial risk for a community development corporation intending
to conduct its charitable activities through the traditional form of
business ventures should its businesses become "too profitable."
Indeed, that risk is ever present since a significant purpose of con-
ducting charitable activities through a business model is to generate
profits of a magnitude sufficient to provide the capital necessary for
an expansion of the charitable functions.
While there are indications to the contrary, " the risk of a total
loss of the exempt status can be diminished by operating the business
enterprises through wholly-owned or majority-controlled subsid-
iaries. The Treasury Department has admitted, in recent congres-
sional testimony, that there is no provision which would prevent an
exempt charity from operating even an unrelated business through
a subsidiary.57  Thus, the community development corporation could
use this device to insulate its charitable activities, and its charitable
exemption, from the conduct of its business activities. Should the
business be later found "unrelated to the parent's charitable pur-
poses," the income flowing to the exempt organization from the sub-
sidiary would not be taxable to the parent as "unrelated business tax-
able income." 8 In addition, the regulations provide that for income
from an unrelated business to be taxed as such the unrelated business
must be "regularly carried on" by the exempt organization." What
constitutes a business "regularly carried on" has been the subject of
55 It is now clear that a single non-exempt purpose, if substantial, will result in the
denial of an exemption. See, e.g., Better Business Bureau of Washington, D.C. v. Uni-
ted States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945).
56 Miller, supra note 13, at 444; cf. Squire v. Student Bookstore Corp., 191 F.2d 1018
(9th Cir. 1951); United States v. Fort Worth Club of Fort Worth, Texas, 345 F.2d 52,
57-58 (5th Cir.), modified on rehearing, 348 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1965); Rev. Rul. 67-
104, 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 120.
57 House Hearings, supra note 32, at 5098. The question of whether the subsidi-
aries are exempt on the rationale that they are performing, at least in part, the exempt
functions of the parent, will not be treated here. Suffice it to say that such an argument
ignores the insulation notion and brings the community development corporation out of
a relatively cool frying pan into what might be an extremely hot fire.
5 8 I.R.C. § 512(b) (1).
5 9 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a) (2) (1967).
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some case decisions. In Robert A. Welsh Foundation v. United
States,60 the court was faced with the question of whether certain
income generated by oil and gas leases represented royalties rather
than working interests in the wells. The actual interests in the wells
were held by a subsidiary of the exempt foundation, payment being
made to the foundation pursuant to certain overriding royalty con-
tracts. Because the Code excludes royalties from unrelated business
income,"' the Commissioner was compelled to argue that the overrid-
ing royalties were not in fact royalties, but instead were income from
working interests and thus should be taxable as unrelated business
income. In determining the income to be royalties, the court stated:
The owner of ... a working interest is actively engaged in its op-
erations at all times and such operations ...are the carrying on
of a trade or business. On the other hand, the owner of an over-
riding royalty ...is not engaged in any operations . . . .The
word [business] ... implies that one is kept more or less busy,
that the activity is an occupation.62
Under a similar rationale, it has been held, with respect to a sale and
lease-back transaction, that fiscal operating controls imposed by the
lessor do not constitute an active, day-to-day participation in the bus-
iness affairs of the lessee.' The regulations would define the unre-
lated business as "regularly carried on" if the activity is sufficiently
consistent "to indicate a continuing purpose of the organization to
derive some of its income from such activity." 4 But the noted case
law suggests that the unrelated business may still be deemed not
"regularly carried on" if the exempt organization does not actively
engage itself in the day-to-day activity of operating that business.
Thus, if a community development corporation does nothing else by
reason of its stock ownership than exercise its right to select direc-
tors of the subsidiary, it may well avoid the loss of its exempt status.
Other considerations, however, have been interposed by the Tax
Reform Act of 1969. Indeed, it is evident that that enactment,
whether designed to encompass community development corpora-
tions or not, portends to have a substantial effect on the operations
of these organizations.
60 228 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Tex. 1963), aff'd, 334 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1964).
6 1 See I.R.C. § 512(b)(2).
62 228 F. Supp. at 887 (emphasis added).
63 University Hill Foundation v. Comm'r, 51 T.C. 548, 568 (1969). Cf. Amon G.
Carter Foundation v. United States, 58-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9342 (N.D. Tex. 1958).
64 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a)(3) (1967).
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III. THE TAx REFORm ACT
A. A Brief History
It was once observed that "if abuse [by private foundations] is
too wide spread, the legislators may be stimulated to enact corrective
measures which could easily redound to the detriment of bona fide
foundations." 65  That gratuitious prophecy having gone unheeded,
the legislators enacted corrective measures, and to the extent that
these measures affect community development corporations, they in-
deed redound to the detriment of bona fide foundations.
What prompted the congressional response to private founda-
tions can be best described by a brief (admittedly over-simplified)
example. Mr. Jones (or Messrs. Henry and Edsel Ford if you will)
owns the controlling interest of Y corporation, a profitable business
corporation. Desiring to preserve control of the corporation for his
family and, in addition, to provide a ready source for charitable con-
tributions whenever his individual tax situation dictates, Jones creates
a charitable foundation to which he donates a substantial portion of
the voting and/or hon-voting stock in Y corporation. The founda-
tion's articles of incorporation are drafted so as to assure a charitable
exemption and consequently to assure Jones of a charitable deduction
for the fair market value of his Y stock.66 The articles or by-laws
provide that the trustees of the new foundation shall be Jones and
others, either family or friends, whom he may choose. The founda-
tion receives its income either from dividends paid by Y corporation
or from investments in other securities or property secured with
funds provided by those dividends, or with funds realized from the
sale of a portion of Y stock. Income not used to secure more profita-
ble investments would be accumulated until such time as the founda-
tion is enabled to make charitable contributions and engage in specu-
lative investment activities - the latter, more often than not, tak-
ing precedence. Finally, the foundation would not seek charitable
donations from persons other than Jones and his immediate family.
This "gimmick" yields a number of benefits to Jones. First, the
disposition of Y stock reduced the value of Jones' estate sufficiently
to enable him to bequeath the remainder of the stock in Y corpora-
6 5 Eaton, Charitable Foundation, Tax Avoidance and Business Expediency, 35 VA.
L. REV. 987, 1036 (1949).
66I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(D). This section was amended by section 201(a)(1)(B) of
Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 549-58 (1969). For an explanation of the effects of this
amendment on the contribution of capital gain property, see Myers & Quiggle, Charita-
ble Contributions and Bequests: The Impact of the Tax Reform Act, 39 FoR1DHAM L
REV. 185 (1970).
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tion to his beneficiaries without the necessity of liquidating to pay
estate taxes.67 Secondly, by reason of his position as trustee of the
foundation, Jones never lost voting control of Y corporation. As
implied above, the private charitable foundation could also be uti-
lized as an easy "bail out" for one who held stock in a close corpora-
tion suffering losses, the only stipulation being that the charitable
foundation be set up in such a way as to cloud that function as its
primary purpose.68 The private foundation also provided a ready
source of loan capital and grant funds for the donor, his relatives
and friends and enterprises controlled by these persons.6" Finally,
assuming the foundation would accumulate its earnings, the donor
would get an immediate tax benefit in the form of a charitable de-
duction while the contemplated co-extensive benefit to society would
be postponed for an indeterminate period of time.70
In an attempt to rectify such obvious abuses, Congress, in 1950,
prohibited charitable foundations from engaging in certain self-deal-
ing transactions, but only to the extent that the nature of those trans-
actions indicated preferential treatment by the foundation to the
creator of or substantial contributor to the foundation or to a corpora-
tion controlled by such person.71 Congress also enacted section 504
which prohibited certain charitable foundations from unreasonably
accumulating income or investing that income in such a manner as to
jeopardize the carrying on of its exempt functions.72  These provi-
sions were specifically applicable only to organizations which were
neither religious, educational, related to an exempt hospital or medi-
cal research facility nor supported by government funds or direct or
indirect contributions from the general public.78
6
7 See Eaton, supra note 65, at 991; Note, Criticized Uses of Federal Tax Exemption
Privilege by Charitable Foundations and Educational Institutions, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 696
(1950); Note, The Uses of Charitable Foundations for Avoidance of Taxes, 34 VA. L.
REV. 182 (1948).68 Curt Teich Foundation v. Comm'r, 48 T.C. 963, 969-74 (1967); cf. Scholarship
Endowment Foundation v. Nicholas, 25 F. Supp. 511 (Colo. 1938), afd, 106 F2d 552
(10th Cir. 1939); Davenport Foundation v. Comm'r, 16 T.C. Mem. 83 (1947), aff'd
per curiam, 170 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1948); Security First National Bank of Los Angeles
v. Comm'r, 28 B.T.A. 289 (1933).69 Home Oil Mill v. Willingham, 68 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ala. 1945); Griswold v.
Comm'r, 39 T.C. 620 (1962); Cummins-Collins Foundation v. Comm'r, 15 T.C. 613
(1950); Estate of Agnes C. Robinson v. Comm'r, 1 T.C. 19 (1942); cf. Estate of Edward
T. Bedford v. Comm'r, 39 B.T.A. 1039 (1939).7 0 TR.EAmRY REPORT, supra note 32, at 6-7.
71 I.R.C. § 503(c), presently I.R.C. § 503(b) (redesignated as such by § 101(j)(14) of
Pub. L No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 527 (1969).
72I.LC. § 504, repealed by 101(j)(14) of Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 527
(1969).
7 3 1.RC. § 503(b), repealed by § 101(j)(8) of Pub. L No. 91-172, 83 Stat 527
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The 1950 provisions, however, were unsuccessful in curbing abuse
of the foundation's tax benefits. Section 503 did not prohibit self-
dealing between a foundation and its contributors and affiliates, but
merely prevented diversion of funds from charitable purposes to pri-
vate purposes under unreasonable terms and conditions. Indeed, it
is arguable that section 503 restricted rather than assisted the policing
of private foundations by the Treasury Department.74  Section 504
may have cured long term accumulations, even where a purpose for
the accumulation was specified 5 but it went no further than that lim-
itation. Furthermore, judicial interpretations of section 504 made
it clear that as long as a specific project was articulated either in the
document creating the organization or in the policies of the organiza-
tion promulgated subsequently, and the time over which the accumu-
lation extended did not seem patently outlandish, the provisions of
(1969) (emphasis added). A so-called publicly supported foundation was never defined
statutorily. Indeed, the term went undefined until 1966, some two years following the
addition of § 170(b)(1)(A)(vi), which provided a 30% deduction to "publicly supported
charities." See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) (added by § 209(a) of Pub. L. No. 88-272,
78 Stat. 48 (1964). The definition of a publicly supported charity which the Treasury
Department relied upon prior to the enactment of the 1969 act can be found in Treas.
Reg. § 1.170-2(b)(5)(iii) (1966). Generally, the regulation posed two tests, the meet-
ing of either one of which would suffice. The first test, the "Mechanical test" is found in
§ 1.170-2(b)(5)(iii)(B). That is, one-third of an organization's support must come from
a governmental unit or from direct or indirect contributions from the general public.
The second test, the so-called "facts and circumstances" test found in § 1.170-2(b)(5)(iii)
(c), provided that an organization may be treated as publicly supported if certain indices
of public accountability and/or public access to their facilities are met. These include
public disclosure of financial data, a governing board comprised of public officials or
others representing a broad base of community support, or facilities which are generally
open to the public. A community development corporation which previously relied on
either of these two tests as definitive of public support may have to reassess its position
in light of I.R.C. § 509(a)(2). Cf. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 56-59
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report]; H.R. Rep. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, at 41 (1969) [hereinafter cited as House Report]. A caveat is prompted
by a proposed regulation defining an organization as publicly supported within the
meaning of I.R.C. §§ 509(a)(1) and 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) even if it receives more than one-
third of its support from gross investment income and consequently is disqualified under
I.R.C. § 509(a) (2). Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e), 36 Fed. Reg. 9300 (1971).
The rationale of this proposed regulation is a mystery, given the clear congressional pol-
icy limiting the amount of investment income an organization can earn and still
be treated as a publicly supported charity. Even a greater mystery is how the Treasury
Department can preserve any "facts and circumstances" test in light of the statutory struc-
ture which is clearly directed at the source of funding and not at accountability of those
who have corporate power to expend those funds once received. See Proposed Treas.
Reg. 1.170A-9(e) (v)&(vi), 36 Fed. Reg. 9301 (1971).
74 Cf. Curt Teich Foundation v. Comm'r, 48 T.C. 963 (1967); Cummins-Collins
Foundation v. Comm'r, 15 T.C. 613 (1950).
75 See, e.g., Schoellkopf v. United States, 124 F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1942) (implicit
approval of a precatory accumulation provision of 150 years). See also John Danz v.
Comm'r, 231 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1955); Arthur Jordan Foundation v. Comm'r, 210 F.2d
885 (7th Cit. 1954).
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section 504(a) were not violated.76 In addition, the Treasury De-
partment was rarely, if ever, successful in challenging accumulations
generated by speculative investments, even when those investments
might have jeopardized the purposes for which the money was alleg-
edly being accumulated.77  Finally, even if these provisions could
have cured foundation abuses, it is clear that the Treasury Depart-
ment had neither the interest nor the financial wherewithal to insure
foundation compliance.78
What followed is now history; a history which has been so well
documented in the literature79 that it no longer bears repeating.
Suffice it to say that after some nine years of hearings, four reports by
Representative Wright Patman's Select Committee on Small Busi-
ness, one report by the United States Treasury Department and vari-
ous Presidential messages, Congress enacted provisions regulating
private foundations. Those provisions affect far more, however,
than just the possibility of self-dealing by private foundations. 80 In
the effort to curb the abuses of some, Congress has brought under its
regulatory umbrella the legitimate community development corpora-
76 Hulman Foundation v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 423 (S.D. Ind. 1962) (accu-
mulation of income for 12 years to construct a public coliseum held proper). But see
Rev. Rul. 67-106, 1967-1 CUM. BULL. 127 (1967) (accumulation of income for twenty
years for general distribution to a tax exempt school does not meet the specificity of proj-
ect test). See also Stevens Bros. Foundation v. Comm'r, 324 F.2d 633, 639-40 (8th Cir.
1963); Danforth Foundation v. United States, 347 F.2d 673, 678 (8th Cir. 1965); Erie
Endowment v. United States, 316 F.2d 151 (3rd Cir. 1963). See generally Duhl, Tax
Exempt Organizations: The Attack on Unreasonable Accumulations of Income, 57 GEO.
L. J. 483 (1969).
77 Samuel Friedland Foundation v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 74 (D.N.J. 1956).
But see Randall Foundation v. Riddell, 244 F.2d 803, 808 (9th Cir. 1957) which held
that a charity which did little but invest in speculative stock issues was not charitable.
The court, however, appeared to rest its decision more on the Foundation's not meeting
the "operated exclusively for" test in 501(c)(3) rather than on its using funds in a man-
ner which jeopardized its charitable purposes.
7 8 TAx EXEMPT FOUNDATIONS: THEIR IMPAcT ON SMALL BUSINESS, Hearings
Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the Select House Committee on Small Business, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess., 1-4, 218-19, 235-46, 257-59 (1967).
79 See J. RusKAY AND R. OSSERMAN, HALFWAY TO TAX REFORM 29-49 (1970);
W. WEAVER, U.S. PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATIONS 198-219 (1967); Folk, Regulation
of Charitable Foundations - The Patman and Treasury Reports, 20 Bus. LAWYER 1015
(1965); Krasnowiecki & Brodsky, Coymment on the Patman Report, 112 U. PA. L. REV.
190 (1963); Peril, Tax-Exempt Targets: The Patman Report and Private Charitable
Foundations, 42 TAXES 69 (1964); Riecker, Foundations and the Patman Report, 63
MftcH. L. REV. 95 (1964); Troyer, The Treasury Department Report on Private Founda-
tions: A Response to Some Criticisms, 13 U.C.L-A. L. REV. 965 (1966).
80 I.R.C. § 4941(a) imposes an initial tax of 5% on a disqualified person with respect
to foundations [as defined in I.R.C. § 4946(b)] for any act of self dealing. This tax is
increased to 200% on the disqualified person and 50% on the foundation if restitution
is nor made within 90 days of the receipt of a deficiency notice pursuant to § 6212.
I.R.C. §§ 4941(b) and 4945(i).
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tion, "privately" financed but dearly operated for the benefit of per-
sons other than a contributor, his relatives or the business entities
which they control. The remainder of this article will be devoted to
an analysis of the private foundation provisions of the act as they are
specifically applicable to community development corporations.
B. Definition of Private Foundations - Its Effect on Financing
In somewhat typical fashion, Congress has defined a private foun-
dation as all organizations "described in section 501(c) (3) other
than [those specifically excepted] .... 81 Consequently, a commu-
nity development corporation, the activities of which are charitable
within the meaning of section 501 (c) (3), must fall within one of
the excepted categories in order to avoid being treated as a private
foundation. These excepted categories can be classified by the
nature of the organization's charitable activities and the sources
from which the organization receives its funds. The activities of a
community development corporation are not of the kind expressly
contemplated by Congress for exclusion from private foundation
treatment. Organizations excluded by reason of their activities in-
clude churches, educational institutions, hospitals, medical research
facilities, governmentally or publicly supported but governmentally
controlled organizations operated to administer property and make
expenditures for the benefit of a college or university, units of gov-
ernment,82 organizations operated for testing for public safety 3 and
organizations controlled by one or more publicly supported organi-
zations operated solely to carry on one or more of the exempt func-
tions of those organizations."M
A community development corporation must then be exempt
from private foundation treatment, if at all, by reason of its source
of funds. One such as the Hough Area Development Corporation
in Cleveland, Ohio which receives annually 1.5 million dollars pursu-
ant to Title I-D of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964,5 pres-
ently has little worry of being treated as a private foundation for it
clearly is one which receives substantially all of its support from a
governmental unit. 6 These grants, however, are limited to the for-
81 I.R.C. § 509(a) (emphasis added).
82I.R.C. §§ 170(b)(1)(A)(i)-(v).
83I.R.C. § 509(a)( 4 ).
84 I.R.C. § 509(a)(3).
8542 U.S.C. §§ 2763-68 (Supp. V, 1969).
8 6 I.R.C. § 509(a) (1); I.R.C. § 170(b) (1) (A) (vi).
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tuned few. Even with respect to these organizations, the probability
of private foundation treatment increases as the desire for and
achievement of self-support grows.
For the unfortunate many, who must rely on relatively small
grants from other charitable organizations and consequently must
plan for a self-sustaining position relatively early, the danger of pri-
vate foundation treatment is imminent. What determines the tax
treatment of these community development corporations is defined
as "support" which in turn is defined to be gifts, grants, membership
fees, gross receipts from related activities (or at least activities which
are not unrelated), net income from unrelated business activities,
gross investment income, and the value of services furnished by a
governmental unity7  In order to avoid private foundation treat-
ment, a community development corporation must normally: (1) re-
ceive more than one-third of its support from gifts, grants and mem-
bership fees or from gross receipts from activities not unrelated to its
exempt purposes; and (2) may not receive more than one-third of
its support from gross investment income.88
In making the computation necessary to find the first mandatory
one-third ratio, the denominator of the fraction is the total amount
of support received by the community development corporation.
The numerator of the fraction is the decisive factor, for here it is that
the corporation may have difficulty in achieving the required one-to-
three ratio, because the numerator does not include all gifts, grants
or contributions. Rather, the grants included in this figure are only
those received from individuals, from organizations which are not
themselves private foundations, or from governmental units. Fur-
ther, to the extent that a grant received from an individual exceeds
$5000 or is greater than two per cent of the corporation's support for
the taxable year it will not be included in the computation.89 Thus,
if a community development corporation receives a number of ini-
tial operating grants from private foundations and/or substantial pri-
vate donors, it may find that it has substantial "total support" - the
87 I.R.C. § 509(d) (emphasis added).
881.R.C. § 509(a)(2)(A),(B). It is possible for a newly formed community develop-
ment corporation to show that in the future it will meet the test of 509(a) (2) even though
by the statutory use of the word "normally," it would appear that the corporation must
show some prior history of financial sources. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-3(d)&
(e). 35 Fed. Reg. 17848-49 (1970).
8 9 I.R.C. § 509(a)(2) provides that the gifts, grants, or contributions must be from
persons other than disqualified persons as defined in § 4946(a)(1)(A). Disqualified
persons are defined to be substantial contributors [I.R.C. § 4946(a)), which in turn are
defined to be persons who give more than $5,000 in any one year if that represents more
than 2% of the foundation's support for that year. I.R.C. § 507(d)(2)(A).
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denominator of the computation - yet lack enough of the support
allowable in the numerator of the figure sufficient to meet the one-
third ratio. Consequently, the corporation would be treated as a
private foundation.9"
Even assuming that a community development corporation could
apply these grants to quickly establish businesses which will be
treated as related and provide sufficient income to allow it to be
largely self-sustaining,9 they will still have difficulty meeting the
mandatory one-third figure. Under section 509, gross receipts from
related activities are included in the numerator only to the extent
that they do not exceed the greater of $5,000 or one per cent of the
organization's support for any taxable year. 2 Thus, the dollar
amount limitations imposed by the Code may prevent the corpora-
tion from ever achieving the 1:3 ratio imposed by the Code.
If a community development corporation operates its businesses
through subsidiaries rather than directly, an option which is (or at
least was) the most advantageous,93 it apparently loses even the
limited advantages which formerly accrued by having the businesses
not treated as unrelated. The second computation now required by
the Code must demonstrate that not more than one-third of the cor-
poration's support comes from gross investment income. 94 Gross in-
vestment income is defined as the gross amount received for interest,
dividends, rents and royalties, but not including any such income to
the extent that it is included in computing the unrelated business in-
come tax.95 Since any amounts received from the subsidiaries will be
treated as dividends,96 and since dividends are excluded from the
computation of unrelated business income tax,97 - the full amount
of such income is used in computing the numerator of this second
"
0 I.R.C. § 509(a) (2). Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-3(a) (2), 35 Fed. Reg.
17845-46 (1970).
91 This is an unlikely result since the question of whether a business is related de-
pends upon the amount of income earned and whether that earned income was planned.
See notes 48-51 supra & accompanying text.
92 I.R.C. § 509(a)(2)(A)(ii). It appears possible to avoid this problem by operating
a number of different businesses each of which earns less than the maximum $5,000 and
1%. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-3(b) (example 2), 35 Fed. Reg. 17846 (1970).
This option, however, would produce a nightmare for both lawyers and business plan-
ners,
93 See notes 5 6-62 supra & accompanying text.
94 I.R.C. § 509(a)(2)(B).
95 I.R.C. § 509(d) (emphasis added).
96 Cf. Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Comm'r, 380 F.2d 146 (1st Cir.) cert denied, 389
U.S. 976 (1967); Rev. Rul. 68-296, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 105.
97I.R.C. § 512(b)(1).
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fraction whether or not such dividends are received from related
businesses.
There is a possibility, albeit slight, that the dividends received
from related businesses will not be treated as gross investment in-
come 98 which must be included in the second fraction, but rather as
gross receipts 9 which may be included in the first fraction. The
Treasury Department regulations illustrate the distinction between
gross investment income and gross receipts with an example of an
organization whose purpose it is to provide housing for low income
war widows. The rents received, according to a proposed regulation,
are to be treated as gross receipts from the operation of a related bus-
iness and not as gross investment income.100 The rationale for this
treatment appears to be that an exempt organization should not be
penalized merely because its income must, of necessity, come from
rents rather than alternative sources. It can be argued by analogy
that all related income should be treated as gross receipts rather than
gross investment income irrespective of the form in which that in-
come is received. This would be consistent with experience which
has indicated that income defined as gross investment income has
generally been that derived from businesses unrelated to the exempt
purposes of the foundation. Therefore, the argument goes, Con-
gress was concerned only with unrelated gross investment income.
Nothing in the official reports supports such a conclusion how-
ever. In fact, it appears that this regulation is little more than a no-
ble attempt by the Treasury Department to "strong arm" the statute.
Section 509(e) specifically includes all "passively earned" income
as gross investment income except to the extent that such income is
included for purposes of computing unrelated business income.
Since the rentals given in the example are not so included, 10 1 the reg-
ulation dearly violates the plain language of the statute. Given this
dear contradiction along with the fact that the regulation is merely
temporary, present reliance on it would be misplaced.
What we have then is a situation wherein a community develop-
ment corporation is treated as a private foundation for no reason
other than the practical reality that private foundations, or even in-
come from related businesses, are the only sources of available fi-
nancing. This makes little sense assuming that the community devel-
98 1.RC. § 509(a)(2)(B).
09I.R.C. § 509(a)(2)(A)(ii).
100 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-3(m)(1) & (2), 35 Fed. Reg.. 17851-52 (1970).
01 I.R.C. § 512(b)(3)(A).
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opment corporation can be organized in a way so as to insure public
accountability for its activities, clearly a possibility under the old
"facts and circumstances" test, but congressionally altered by the
1969 Tax Reform Act.10 2
C. Effect of Private Foundation Status on the Operations of a
Community Development Corporation
The scheme of the Reform Act is one of preserving the exempt
status of private foundations while making them pay for the exercise
of that "privilege", both generally and for specific acts or failures to
act.
(1) Tax on Investment Income
All private foundations must pay a four per cent tax on net in-
vestment income.103 Net investment income is defined as the gross
amount of interest, dividends, rents and royalties, to the extent not
included in computing unrelated business income tax, less the allow-
able expenses incurred in producing that income.104 No statutory
distinction is drawn between income which is produced from related
businesses and that which is not. This tax on investment income
was intended to serve two purposes: (1) to impose a user or excise
tax on the privilege of retaining exempt status, and (2) to provide
the Treasury Department with the financial resources necessary to
enforce the remaining provisions of the act.105
It is, of course, possible for a community development corporation
to avoid this excise tax and at the same time maintain its hope for
self-sufficiency by operating its businesses directly rather than through
subsidiaries. In this way, any income earned from those businesses
would not be treated as dividend income and consequently would
102 See note 73 supra. It is not as if Congress was unaware that the definitions used
for determining whether an organization was privately or publicly financed would include
organizations not conceived of as presenting a regulatory problem. Congress appeared
to be fully aware of this possibility but, at least with respect to defining an organization
one way or the other, apparently chose to ignore it. See Senate Hearings, supra note 32,
at 5412-15, 6189, 6000-01, 6429-31. Congressional attempts to compensate for
private foundation classification by other means - i.e., allowing a "50% contribu-
tion deduction" to selected private foundations (I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(vii) & (viii))
and exempting "operating foundations" from a tax on the failure to distribute income
(I.R.C. § 4 942(a)(1)) - may be of little value once the initial classification as a private
foundation has been made. See Sugarman, Foundation Operations Under the Tax Re-
form Act, 48 TAXES 767 (1970).
103 I.R.C. § 4 9 4 0(a).
104 I.R.C. § 49 4 0(c).
105 House Report, supra note 73, at 19-20; Senate Report, supra note 73, at 27-28.
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not be denominated as investment income. Yet an assessment of the
relative risks may well dictate the subsidiary approach as the better
route, notwithstanding the four per cent tax and the effect which
that tax might have on future expenditures for additional economic
development projects.
In the first place, operating the businesses directly rather than
through subsidiaries would subject each business to the liabilities of
the others and, in addition, subject the general assets of the corpora-
tion, including its endowment, to the liabilities of all the busi-
nesses. 6 Secondly, as noted above, operating the businesses directly
would dissipate any insulation of the community development cor-
poration's exempt activities from the operation of businesses which,
if they became too successful, might well be treated as unrelated.
Consequently, it seems that a community development corporation
which may be classified as a private foundation has little alternative
but to subject itself to the four per cent tax when and if its business
subsidiaries become profitable and until such later time as these bus-
inesses are disposed of or transferred to residents of the community
in which the development corporation operates.
(b) Tax on failure to distribute income
Prior to 1969, section 504 of the Code provided for the revocation
of a foundation's tax exemption upon a determination that income
was being unreasonably accumulated. Evidencing a concern with
the harshness of this provision as well as with the Code's scheme of
defining an unreasonable accumulation, Congress in 1969 repealed
section 504 in favor of a tax on accumulated earnings. 0 7  Section
4942 now imposes on private foundations a 15 per cent tax on all in-
come remaining undistributed at the beginning of the next succeed-
ing taxable year.'08 This tax is increased to 100 per cent on any in-
come not distributed within 90 days after the foundation receives a
deficiency notice from the Commissioner. 0 9
For purposes of determining what must be distributed income is
106 The assumption is that if the businesses are operated as subsidiaries, those subsidi-
aries can be so organized and operated as to avoid creditors piercing the corporate veil.
See, e.g., Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp., 324 F.2d 157, 160-61 (7th Cir.
1963); North v. Higbee Co., 131 Ohio St. 507, 3 N.. 2d 391, cert. denied, 300 U.S. 655
(1936). See generally H. HENN, LAw OF COR'ORATIONS § 148 (2d ed. 1970); F.
POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 9 (1931); Comment, Disregarding
the Corporate Entity: Contract Claims, 28 OHIO ST. L J. 441 (1967).
107 Senate Report, supra note 73, at 35; House Report, supra note 73, at 25.
lo8I.R.C. § 4942(a).
109 I.R.C. §§ 4942(b) & 4942(j) (2).
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generally defined as the gross amount of income, including net short
term capital gains, less those deductions normally allowable to a cor-
poration subject to taxation under section 11 of the Code. 110 In addi-
tion, income is defined as that which is imputed from the net aggre-
gate fair market value of all the assets of the foundation (other than
those used directly in carrying out the organization's exempt func-
tions) at the rate of six per cent per annum."' Net aggregate fair
market value is determined by computing the excess of the fair mar-
ket value of those assets over the existing acquisition indebtedness
with respect to those assets. 112 The amount which then must be dis-
tributed is the greater of the actual adjusted net income and that
which is imputed from the net asset value.113
A community development corporation which has been deter-
mined to be a private foundation may well find its operations ham-
pered by the requirement that it distribute its income. Assuming an
income in excess of that imputed from its assets, a community devel-
opment corporation has two choices. Its first choice is to reinvest
those funds in the same business which produced the income or, alter-
natively, retain that income in the business, if operated as a subsidi-
ary.114  If the business which produced the income can be described
as one which directly carries out the corporation's exempt purposes,
a somewhat doubtful proposition if the business earns sufficient in-
come to risk being treated as unrelated within the meaning of section
513, then that expenditure, at least theoretically, might be treated as
a qualifying distribution. Theoretically, because a contribution to
an organization controlled directly or indirectly by the foundation is
excluded from the definition of a qualifying distribution." 5  Thus,
if the business is operated as a subsidiary and if the subsidiary is
treated as a separate entity for purposes of section 4942, any distribu-
tion to that subsidiary will not be treated as qualifying even if the
subsidiary performs part of the exempt functions of the parent.16
110 I.R.C. § 4942(f)(1). Modifications to the definition of income are set forth in
I.R.C. § 4942(f)(2). Modifications with respect to allowable deductions are contained
in I.R.C. § 4942(f)(3).
III I.R.C. § 4942(e)(1)-(3).
112I.R.C. § 4942(e)(1)(A). Acquisition indebtedness is defined as any unpaid
amount with respect to a particular asset, which is attributable to the acquisition of such
asset. I.R.C. § 514 (c)(1).
113 I.R.C. § 4942(d).
114 It is unlikely that retention of income in an operating subsidiary will avoid the
provision of section 4942. Cf. Rev. Rul. 68-296, 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 105.
115I.R.C. § 4942(g)(1)(A)(i).
116 While no interpretive regulations on this point have been promulgated, it is likely
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
The second available choice, that of investing the income in new
businesses, presents the same dilemma but with different dimensions.
First, the amount of capital necessary for the establishment of a new
business, even with the availability of the various federal loan pro-
grams, can be quite substantial. Indeed, this capital requirement is
undoubtedly more substantial than the amount which can realistically
be anticipated as yearly earnings. So unless a community develop-
ment corporation can match those earnings with additional grant
money, it may be forced to accumulate. Accumulation is permissible
(i.e., it may be treated as a qualifying distribution) only if the period
of time does not exceed five years an&tthen only if the corporation can
demonstrate to the Secretary. that a specific project is contemplated,
that the project is of a charitable nature and that the project is better
served by the accumulation than by an immediate distribution."7 If
the pre-1969 case law is any indication of how the Secretary-Will deal
with the question of specificity, it is dear that merely some general
idea of the kind of venture contemplated will not suffice." 8 Most
community development corporations have not yet reached the level
of sophistication necessary to develop a five or even two year plan,
much less the ability to sufficiently document the funds needed and
the projected time period for acquiring those funds. Secondly, if the
phrase "assets ... used... directly for the carrying out of the foun-
dation's purpose" is interpreted as co-extensive with existing notions
of relatedness as used in section 513, extreme caution must be exer-
cised with respect to the kinds of new businesses contemplated.
It is possible, if not likely, that the businesses will earn no in-
come, at least for a certain period of time. In such a situation in-
come will be computed on the basis of the corporation's net asset
value, possibly forcing the community development corporation to
liquidate some of its productive assets or dip into its endowment in
order to make a qualifying distribution. The only way to avoid this
result is to convince the Treasury Department that the assets are be-
ing used directly to frther the organization's exempt purpose.
Given the fact that the businesses are producing no income, the like-
lihood is that the businesses will be treated as related and a fortiori
furthering the organization's exempt purposes. But a tax on any un-
that the subsidiary will in fact be treated as a separate entity. See note 118 infra and
accompanying text.
117 I.R.C. § 4942(g)(2). The intent of Congress was to permit an extension of the
five year period if good cause for the extension is shown. House Report, supra note 73,
at 26.
118 E.g., Danforth Foundation, v. United States, 347 F.2d 673, 678 (8th Cir. 1965).
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expended endowment is likely to be difficult to avoid unless the com-
munity development corporation is exempted altogether from the
provisions of section 4942.
An exemption from section 4942 is granted to so-called operat-
ing foundations.'" These are private foundations which make quali-
fying distributions of substantially all their adjusted net income 120
directly for the active conduct of activities constituting the basis of
the organizations' exemption, and which meet at least one of three
other tests: - the income test, the endowment test or the support
test.
The likelihood that a community development corporation will
meet the tests imposed for an operating foundation are, at present,
somewhat speculative and may well hinge on whether the businesses
are operated directly or through subsidiaries. The problems are
created by the regulatory definition of "directly for the active con-
duct." The proposed regulations are clear that a distribution of net
investment income to a subsidiary does not qualify as an expendi-
ture being made directly for the active conduct of the exempt activ-
ities; rather, the funds must be used by the exempt organization it-
self.' 2 ' An exception is provided for grants to individuals or corpo-
rate enterprises where the donor maintains "significant involvement"
with the activities of the donee.'22  These regulations seem to con-
template, however, that the donee be organizationally unrelated to
the donor and that the purpose of the grant be to encourage such
an organization to enter the foundation's particular area of endeavor.
In addition, the kinds of controls over the donee's activities which
the regulations anticipate are seemingly inconsistent with the ratio-
nale for operating the businesses as subsidiaries in the first instance.
In any event, the obstacles imposed by section 4942 are not insur-
mountable, even if the community development corporation oper-
ates its business through subsidiaries. All that is required is a segre-
gation of grant funds from income funds, with the corporation
using the latter to finance its planning and community coordination
activities and using the former to provide a venture capital pool for
future business development.
119 I.R.C. § 4942(a)(1).
120 Substantially all the net income is defined to be an amount in excess of 85 per
cent. House Report, supra note 73, at 26. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(b)-2(e),
36 Fed. Reg. 109 (1971).
121 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 52.4942(b)-(2)(b)(1)(2)&(3) (1971), 36 Fed. Reg. 107
(1971).
122 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 52.4942(b)-2(c), 36 Fed. Reg. 108 (1971).
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Having done this, the community development corporation must
then meet either the asset, endowment or support test. Under the
mechanical requirements of the support test, substantially all the
support, excluding gross investment income, must come from the
general public and five or more exempt organizations (which may
be private foundations), so long as no exempt organization is con-
trolled directly or indirectly by one of the other five and so long as
one organization does not contribute more than 25 per cent of the
support. In addition, not more than one-half of the community de-
velopment corporation's total support can be derived from gross in-
vestment income. 123  The endowment test also presents little more
than problems of mathematical computation. Qualifying distribu-
tions must be made in an amount not less than two-thirds of the
community development corporation's imputed income.124
Compliance with the asset test is considerably more difficult in
view of intrinsic complexities which, because there are yet no inter-
pretative regulations, are still unresolved. The asset test requires
that substantially more than half the assets 2- of the community de-
velopment corporation must either: (1) be devoted directly to the
activities which form the basis of its exemption or to "functionally
related businesses;" or (2) be stock in the controlled subsidiaries of
the corporation, at least eighty-five per cent of the assets of which are
devoted to the performance of the corporation's exempt functions. "
Here, again, if the development corporation conducts its activities
directly rather than through subsidiaries, it must devote in excess of
sixty-five per cent of its assets directly to the conduct of those busi-
nesses. However, these businesses need not meet the strict tests of
relatedness imposed by section 513. Rather, they need only be
"functionally related" to the exempt purposes of the community de-
velopment corporation. 127
A business to be functionally related must: (1) not be unre-
lated within the meaning of section 513; or (2) even if technically
unrelated, must be functionally integrated with a number of other
activites conducted by the development corporation which are re-
lated to the exempt purposes. 28  This means that a business which
123. I.C. § 4942(j)(3)(B)(iii).
12 4 I.R.C. § 4942(j)(e)(B)(ii).
125This has been defined to be an amount in excess of sixty-five per cent. Pro-
posed Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(b)-3(c), 36 Fed. Reg. 110 (1971).
126 I.R.C. § 4942(j)(3)(B)(i) (emphasis added).
127 Id.
128LR.C. § 4942(j)(5).
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may be unrelated because of the amount of income it earns or the
manner in which it is conducted may nevertheless be functionally
related if conducted as an integral part of the corporation's other
charitable activities. The closest analogy one can find is the regula-
tory example where the same facility or asset is used for a dual pur-
pose, one related and the other not. In that situation, the Treasury
Department has taken the position that any income earned from
the use of the facility or asset for a non-exempt purpose is unre-
lated income. 129  Redefining the issue within the context of that ex-
ample to be whether the full value of the dual-used asset should be
included within the sixty-five per cent measuring rod, the answer
would seem to be that it is, even if the income derived therefrom
would, in part, be taxed under section 5 11.130
It would seem then that a community development corporation
which operates its businesses directly will have little difficulty being
classified as an operating foundation if at the same time it can retain
its exempt status. If, however, the community development corpo-
ration operates its businesses as subsidiaries, and assuming it can meet
the initial distribution test by segregating its grant funds from its
income, it must then show that at least sixty-five per cent of its assets
consist of the stock of controlled corporations which in turn devote
eighty-five per cent of their assets directly for the purposes for which
the parent is exempt or to activities functionally related to those
purposes. 131
These tests may be difficult to meet for two reasons. First, the
value of the subsidiaries' stock held by the community development
corporation may well be less than sixty-five per cent of its other as-
sets, including endowment, depending upon the regulations which
129Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(4)(iii) (1967).
130 The Senate, at least, thought that investments in "small business in central cities
or in corporations to assist neighborhood renovation" would be functionally related if:
(1) it could be reasonably said that neighborhood renovation is within the foundation's
charitable purposes; and (2) a significant purpose of that investment is not the produc-
tion of income. Senate Report, sapra note 73, at 41. It should be noted that the Senate,
apparently somewhat confused by the varying degrees of relatedness established by the
Code, denominated these investments as "program related" investments, a term reserved
for section 4944. That this designation is a misnomer is evident by the Senate's stipula-
tion that the investment must be part of the foundation's charitable program, a notion
not included within the definition of program related investments as set forth in I.R.C.
§ 4944(c). See also Proposed Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(b)-3(b)(1), 36 Fed. Reg. 109-110
(1971), and the text accompanying notes 140-42 infra.
131 I.R.C. § 4942(I)(3)(B)(1). The control required of the community development
corporation over the subsidiary is eighty per cent of all outstanding stock, the same as
required under I.R.C. § 368(c). Proposed Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(b)-3(a), 36 Fed. Reg.
109 (1971).
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the Secretary has yet to promulgate on the valuation of securities for
which no market quotations are readily available.'32 Secondly, the
subsidiary faces the same problem as the parent in showing that its
activities are related, or functionally related to the parent's exempt
purposes. Thus, to the extent that the Treasury Department -may
find that an asset of the subsidiary is held for the production of in-
come, apparently even to a limited degree, the value of the asset is
wholly excluded from the computation. This determination is ad
hoc and is, therefore, subject to as little predictability as the deter-
mination of whether a business is related or unrelated within the
meaning of section 513.83
c. Tax on Excess Business Holdings
Section 4943 of the Code, imposing a tax on the excess busi-
ness holdings of the foundations, reflects congressional concern with
the use of foundations to maintain family control of businesses, the
subordination of charitable purposes to business enterprises, the po-
tential for unfair competition with tax-paying rivals, and the inabil-
ity of the prior law to sufficiently define the point at which a founda-
tion's involvement with businesses was sufficiently significant to
warrant a loss of exemption.34 Generally, section 4943 penalizes a
private foundation for holding in excess of twenty per cent of the vot-
ing control (or thirty-five per cent when it is clear that a third party
has effective control) 35 of any business enterprise other than one
that is either functionally related to the foundation or one which
receives at least ninety-five per cent of its income from so-called pas-
sive sources.' 6 . The penalty is a tax of five per cent of the value of
those excess holdings, increased to 200 per cent if the appropriate
amount of voting control is not disposed of within ninety days after
receipt of a deficiency notice. 37
It is apparent that section 4943 jeopardizes a community develop-
ment corporation only if it conducts its activities, or any part thereof,
through subsidiary corporations rather than directly, and then only
if those subsidiaries are not functionally related to the activities of
I321IRC. § 4942(e)(2).
'33 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 53A942(b)-3(b)(2), 36 Fed. Reg. 110 (1971) states that
"(w)hether an asset is held for the production of income ... rather than being used di-
rectly in the active conduct of the foundation's exempt activities... is a question of fact."
I 3USee House Report, supra note 73, at 27; Senate Report, supra note 73, at 38-39.
'a5I.R.C. § 4943(c).
136 I.R.C. § 4943(d)(4).
3 LR.C. § 4943(a)&(b).
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the corporation. An analytical difficulty, however, is raised by the
fact that "functionally related" has the same meaning whether used
under section 4942 or section 4943. While the broad question is
the same under both sections - that is whether a private foundation
has made proper use of its funds - the answer to that question is de-
termined in two distinct factual contexts. Section 4942 views the
question within the context of a single legal entity whereas section
4943 apparently requires that the activities of an entity be compared
to the activities of an entirely separate entity to determine whether
the two are sufficiently complementary to justify the investment.
While "entity comparing" appears to be what Congress had in
mind under section 4943,138 it may be difficult to make such compar-
isons with respect to a community development corporation. The
examples used by the Senate deal with separately incorporated mu-
seum cafeterias and the Inn and Lodge at Williamsburg, Virginia.
In the first place these examples concern subsidiary entities which are
operated only for the convenience of visitors to those facilities, not
as businesses qua businesses. Secondly, the comparison appears to be
between the activities of the subsidiary and those of the exempt par-
ent. It is doubtful that this analysis fits a community development
corporation which conducts all of its activities, save planning for new
kinds of businesses, through subsidiaries. Consequently, a commu-
nity development corporation should either plan for the conduct of
some of its charitable ventures directly or alternatively be prepared
to justify its subsidiary holdings on grounds that they are related
within the meaning of section 513.
(d) Tax on Investments which Jeopardize Charitable Programs
In an attempt to restrict the right of a charitable foundation to
invest its funds in speculative ventures and, in addition, to impose
some federal controls on the discretion usually afforded foundation
managers operating in the capacity of public fiduciaries, Congress
provided in section 4944 that a private foundation and its man-
ager(s) shall be taxed at the rate of five per cent on the amount of
any investment which is deemed to jeopardize the execution of the
foundation's exempt purposes. 39 Notwithstanding the speculative
nature of an investment, however, it does not fall within the purview
138 Senate Report, supra note 73, at 41.
189 I.RC. § 4 9 4 4 (a). This tax on the foundation is increased to 25 per cent if it does
not recoup that investment within 90 days after the receipt of a deficiency notice. I.R.C.
§ 4944(b)(1). An additional 5 per cent tax is imposed upon any manager who refuses
to agree to a recoupment of the investment. I.R.C. § 4944(b)(2).
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of section 4944 if it is "program related."140  An investment is pro-
gram related if it accomplishes any one charitable purpose and does
not have, as a significant purpose, the production of income. With
this exception, it would seem that a community development corpo-
ration has little to fear from section 4944. An activity designed to
provide job opportunities and training is charitable, whether con-
ducted through a subsidiary or directly.'41 Whether an additional
purpose is the production of income and whether that purpose is
significant are questions of fact, but questions which likely can be
determined in favor of the community development corporation,
particularly given the abuses which section 4944 was designed to
correct.
142
Section 4944, does, however, present an interesting example of
how an already confusing area can be further confused, even to the
present point of being all but incomprehensible. Sections 511-13
deal with the question of whether an activity is related to the ex-
empt functions of a charity. A body of law has developed around
these sections which, while far from adequate for definitional pur-
poses, at least provides the tax planner with a m6dicum, of predic-
tive capacity. Sections 4942 and 4943 use the term "functionally
related," a term which incorporates the previously developed notions
of relatedness but broadens them somewhat to include other activ-
ities which, while not rdated in the strict sense, still are sufficiently
related to justify a charity retaining an interest in them or expend-
ing funds to further their activities. Then, for some unknown rea-
son, in section 4944 Congress uses the term "program related" to
define an exception which, like those in sections 4942 and 4943,
deals with the question of how and for what projects a private
foundation may allocate its funds. "Program related investments"
seem to be a broader category than "functionally related invest-
ments" because the latter includes only those expenditures which
bear a relationship to the purposes and activities for which the foun-
dation was granted its exemption, rather than expenditures which
can generally be classified as for charitable purposes. It is, there-
fore, hypothetically possible for a private foundation to make an
investment which passes the muster of section 4944 and yet, be-
cause it is outside the foundation's present charitable program or
140 I.RC. § 4944(c).
141 See notes 30-36 supra & accompanying text. See also Senate report, supra note
73, at 46.
'
4 2 See Randall Foundation v. Riddell, 244 F.2d 803, 808 (9th Cir. 1957); Samuel
Friedland Foundation v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 74 (D.N.J. 1956).
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operational activities, will not be treated as a qualifying distribution.
Thus, in determining the propriety of making any specific distribu-
tion, the foundation will be safer in relying on the more restrictive
functionally related definition rather than the broader program re-
lated definition, even if the immediate concern is the speculative
nature of the investment.
Finally, in measuring the nature of the expenditure, section 4944
substitutes an objective "prudent trustee" standard'4 3 for the pre-
viously used subjective standard.'44
(e) Reporting Requirements
Of those sections which circumscribe the activities of private
foundations, the reporting and publicity requirements may well
prove to be of most concern, particularly to the small community
development corporation. The impact of these requirements may
be especially great because of the time and consequent expense in-
volved in meeting them and the expense of establishing an account-
ing system adequate to insure compliance. 4 5
Imposition of the new reporting requirements reflects congres-
sional concern with previous reporting requirements'46 which were
inadequate because the information required was incomplete and was
frequently not sufficiently current. 4 7  In addition, prior to the Tax
Reform Act, no penalties were imposed on a charitable foundation's
failure to meet the reporting requirements.
Section 6033 prescribes what must be reported and who must
make the report. It provides that, with a few exceptions, all organ-
izations exempt under section 501 (a) are required to file a so-called
informational return. 48 Only the information required of an organ-
143 Senate Report, supra note 73, at 46.
144 E.g., Samuel Friedland Foundation v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 74 (D.N.J.
1956). That court found it sufficient that the foundation manager, a man with vast
business experience as well as "insider" knowledge of the corporation in which the in-
vestment was made, saw little danger of jeopardy to the foundation's charitable activities.
145 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1(c). 35 Fed. Reg. 16049 (1970), requires most
exempt organizations and all private foundations to keep permanent books of account
and records sufficient to show specifically items of gross income, receipts and disburse-
ments. The authority for this regulation is contained in I.R.C. § 6033(a)(1).
146 I.R.C. § 6033, as amended by section 101(d)(1) of Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat
419-521 (1969).
147 Senate Report, supra note 73, at 52; House Report, supra note 73, at 36.
148 I.R.C. § 6033(a)(1). The exceptions are churches and their auxiliaries and con-
ventions, exclusively religious activities of a religious order and other certain narrowly
defined organizations, not private foundations, whose gross receipts do not normally ex-
ceed $5,000 in any taxable year. See I.R.C. § 6 033(a)( 2 ).
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ization exempt under 501(c)(3), however, is specifically delin-
eated. 49
In addition to filing an informational return, all organizations
classified as private foundations which have assets of $5,000 or more
at any time during the taxable year, must file an annual report.150
The required contents of that report mirror the stipulations of sec-
tion 6033(b) and must include: (1) an itemization of all securities
and other assets, showing both book and market-values; (2) a list
of all grants and contributions made and approved during the year,
the recipient thereof, whether that recipient is related to the founda-
tion, its managers or substantial contributors and a concise statement
of the purpose for which the grant was made; and (3) the names
and addresses of the foundation managers, and which of these per-
sons, if any, are substantial contributors to the foundation or own
10o or more of the interest in any business entity in which the
foundation also owns a ten per cent or greater interest.' 5 ' This in-
formation must be made available by the foundation to state officials
or other persons whom the Secretary prescribes,5 2 and to the general
public.'53 A failure to file either the informational return or the
annual report or both on the appointed day carries a $10 per day
fine (up to $5,000) on the foundation and, in some situations, its
manager(s). M  In addition, section 6685 provides for a fine of
$1000 to be assessed against any party wilfully failing to file' 55
and section 7207 provides for a fine of $1000 and a maximum one
year in prison for knowingly supplying false information on either
the informational return or the annual report. 56
It is not suggested that a community development corporation
will necessarily be subject to the penalties imposed by sections 6685
or 7207. What is suggested is that the penalties imposed are of suf-
ficient severity to prod a community development corporation into
140 I.R.C. § 6033(b). Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2, 35 Fed. Reg. 16049-51
(1970).
150I.R.C. § 6056(a)&(d)(1).
151 I.R.C. § 6056(b) (emphasis added).
152I.R.C. § 6056(d)(3). The information must be made available to designated
state officials by the Secretary at the request of those officials. I.R.C. § 6104(c).
'53 I.R.C. § 6104(d). This is in addition to public and congressional access to the
original exemption application. See I.R.C. §§ 6104(a)(1)(A)&(a)(2).
1' I.R.C. § 6652(d). The manager(s) is subject to the fine only after he fails to
file by the time designated in a deficiency notice issued by the secretary.
155 I.R.C. § 6685. This apparently applies only to a willful failure to file the annual
report, not the information return.
156 I.R.C. § 7207.
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establishing a first-rate accounting procedure, ensuring that the pro-
cedure is constantly and expertly reviewed, and ensuring that those
who maintain or deal with that system possess sufficient expertise.
This is expensive, possibly too expensive for a community develop-
ment corporation which does not possess the assets with which to
achieve what it desires, much less the resources needed to secure the
professional accounting assistance necessary to run a "tight ship.' 157
IV. CONCLUSION - A POSSIBLE WAY OUT
Two additional provisions have not been discussed primarily be-
cause these should pose little difficulty for a community develop-
ment corporation under normal operating circumstances. 5 8 The sec-
tions of the Code which have been discussed, however, pose some
rather difficult problems for a community development corporation
dependent for its support upon private foundations and whatever
additional income can be generated from its business ventures.
For these entities, several alternatives exist.
First, by operating its businesses directly the community develop-
ment corporation can avoid the tax on net investment income, the
penfalty tax on excess business holdings and possibly the tax on fail-
ure to distribute income. Yet, the avoidance of these taxes is under-
taken at the risk of: (1) jeopardizing all its activities for the sake of
one which was initially ill-conceived, and (2) of losing its exempt
status altogether. Even assuming these risks are considered worth
accepting, this alternative provides at best only a partial solution.
Secondly, the community development corporation may termi-
nate its status as a private foundation either by changing its pattern
of support or distributing its net assets to a similar organization
which is publicly supported and has been so for at least five years
previous to that distribution.15 9 The first possibility - that of chang-
ing its pattern of support - is by hypothesis impossible. The sec-
ond - that of distributing its assets to a publicly supported charity
- is equally unattractive. The likelihood of discovering a commu-
nity development corporation which has been in existence for five
157 See Sugarman, Foundation Operation Under the Tax Reform Act, 48 TAXES
767, 784-86 (1970).
158 These are I.R.C. § 4941 (self-dealing) and I.R.C. § 4945 (taxable expenditures).
159 I.R.C. § 507(b). Termination in any other manner, i.e., by distributing to an-
other charitable community development corporation which is either a private founda-
tion or if publicly supported has not been so for the five year period, will result in a tax
equal to the lesser of the aggregate tax benefit accruing to the corporation and its substan-
tial contributors since its formation or the value of the net assets. I.R.C. § 507(c)&(e).
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years, much less one which has been publicly supported for that time,
is small. Further, lest a community development corporation prosti-
tute its avowed purpose of community betterment by means of com-
munity control, such a publicly supported development corporation
must be located, or be willing to locate, in the same neighborhood
an equally unlikely result.
The corporation could, of course, continue operating as a private
foundation and accept the risks attendant to that status, but there is
another alternative, at least for a new organization or one which is
still awaiting a ruling on its private foundation status.160 A com-
munity development corporation can apply for an exemption under
section 501(c) (4) as a.social welfare organization.
While the new act has changed the procedure for acquiring a
charitable exemption,16 it has not changed what appears to be a
generally accepted principle that an organization meeting the stipu-
lations of section 501 (c) (3) may also be treated as a social welfare
organization under section 501(c)(4).11'
What is sacrificed in adopting this form is the ability to attract
capital by reason of the deduction afforded the contributor. The
real questions, however, are the extent of that sacrifice and whether
the benefits of not being treated as a private foundation make the
trade-off realistic.
The extent of the sacrifice.may not be as great as might appear
at first blush. In the first place, contributions to a social welfare
organization are deductible under section 162 of the Code as ordi-
nary and necessary expenses of doing business if the contributor
can show that the contribution bears a direct relation to his business
and that a possibility of: financial return exists commensurate with
the amount of the contribution. 63  While placing a heavy burden
of proof on the contributor, a businessman threatened by the eco-
nomic vicissitudes of a depressed neighborhood and its consequent
160 The presumption that all organizations described in section 501(c)(3) are private
foundations would seem to apply only up to and including the date on which the organi-
zation requests a contrary ruling. See I.R.C. § 508(b).
361 Prior to 1969, an organization could be classified as charitable without having
had applied for a charitable exemption. See Senate Report, supra note 73, at 53; House
Report, supra note 73, at 37. Presently, for an organization to secure a charitable exemp-
tion it must apply for such a ruling. I.R.C. § 508(a)(1).
'
62 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (1959).
1 63 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15(b) (1958) as amended by T.D. 6819, 1965-1 CuM. BULL.
90; I.T. 3706, 1945-2 CuM. BULL. 87. See also In re San Francisco Bay Exposition, 50
F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Cal. 1943). See generally Note, Tax and Other Legal Aspects of
Business Involvement in Ghetto Development Programs, 20 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 825,
at 848 n. 69.
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effect on the marketability of its property might be a likely candidate
for a contribution. Equally likely, and maybe more desirable in
terms of the amount of the contribution, might be a large corpora-
tion which, because of its location in an economically depressed
neighborhood, is finding it increasingly difficult to attract a skilled
labor force, or one, again because of its location, which is fearful of
the results of civil disorder and therefore willing to purchase, by its
contribution, a certain amount of good will.
Moreover, the private foundation still remains a potential source
of funds. In order to ensure that the grant will be treated as a qual-
ifying distribution, it must be used for charitable purposes, but it
need not necessarily be granted to a charitable organization.' The
grantor is required to exercise expenditure responsibility but this
does not mean that he is required to ensure that the grant will in
fact be expended for charitable purposes. It only means that the
grantor must exercise certain defined precautions to assure that re-
sult. 65
It is not contended here that the suggested approaches to acquir-
ing capital funds will minimize the practical difficulties which will
be faced by a social welfare organization. Indeed, it would be
folly to assert that the same capital-attracting potential exists for a
social welfare organization as for a charitable organization, but
clearly a potential is there. It is equal folly, however, to ignore the
destructive potential of the private foundation provisions on a small
community development corporation. Whether a social welfare ex-
emption is a good trade for a lesser amount of venture capital is a
question impossible of immediate resolution. Nevertheless, it is a
question deserving of thoughtful consideration.
164 I.R.C. § 4942(g)(1)(A).
165 I.R.C. § 4945(d) (4). Proposed Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5 (b), 36 Fed. Reg.
(1971).
